Even without them, prolonging nuclear latency may make sense for most potential nuclear powers, politically, economically, and strategically. Politically, nuclear weapons have not proven to be a broadly useful coercive tool, as it is difficult to credibly threaten the use of such destructive power unless in response to severe security threats.
By contrast, stopping short of building nuclear bombs while keeping or upgrading the relevant technologies can buy a state bargaining leverage often disproportionate to its capabilities.
This is apparently the reason Iran is currently engaging in nuclear activities that have no civil justification. By threatening to go nuclear, even a minor state that otherwise would be ignored on the world stage can pressure proliferation-averse major powers to offer rewards for staying nuclear-free.
Under the Agreed Framework PDF , North Korea was rewarded with a promised supply of light-water reactor plants and half a million tons of free heavy oil annually. Meanwhile, the desire to prevent allies such as Japan and South Korea from developing their own nuclear weapons is often cited as a key reason why the United States should maintain strong security commitments and forward-deployed forces to protect them.
The remainder of this commentary is available at nationalinterest. Indeed, Iran's military posture has led to increases in arms purchases by its neighbors, and a nuclear-armed Iran would likely spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would further destabilize this volatile and vital region.
The US and the international community have a vested interest in maintaining calm in the Middle East. Even as the United States has recently become a net oil exporter, its economy remains heavily dependent on the stability of international oil markets, which still require the continued steady export of oil from the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely further embolden Iran's aggressive foreign policy, including its deep ongoing involvement in Syria, its attacks against Israel via proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist groups, and its sponsorship of rebel insurgents in Yemen.
Having nuclear weapons would embolden this aggression and would likely result in greater confrontations with the international community. Iran already has a conventional weapons capability to hit U. If Tehran were allowed to develop nuclear weapons, the threat it poses would increase dramatically. Iran is generally considered the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, through its financial and operational support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. Iran could even potentially share its nuclear technology and know-how with extremist groups hostile to the United States, Israel and the West.
Iran's nuclear program is clearly intended to develop a nuclear weapons capability. For 18 years, it was kept secret, even though international assistance would have been available to a civilian program. Its Iran has no equity in its successor. In about Iran started building at Natanz, 80 km southeast of Qom, a sophisticated enrichment plant, which it declared to IAEA only after it was identified in by a dissident group.
To May , environmental samples confirmed that both enrichment plants were operating as declared, FEP producing less than 5. One cascade enriches from 3.
The enriched stream is fed into the first cascade. In total, some kg of the 3. In total, Iran has fed kg of 3. The IR-1 machine is the local version of Pakistan's P1 centrifuge design, and Iran developed a variant of the more advanced P2 design. The IR-2m is reported to be at least three times as efficient as the IR It said that these are about 20 times the capacity of IR-1 centrifuges. In July , a major explosion occurred at Natanz, damaging a warehouse used to construct centrifuges.
The AEOI did not confirm the cause of the explosion "because of security concerns. The target capacity was said to be 54, centrifuges. By November the total installed was 15, IR-1 centrifuges, which remained constant to October A total of kg of low-enriched UF 6 3. About kg of the output had been used to make the There was preparatory work on the remaining 12 cascades of IR-2 machines.
Apparently none of these ever operated. In September , after the fact was exposed internationally, Iran told the IAEA that it was building another enrichment plant at Fordow, about 20 km north of Qom, in an underground tunnel complex on a military base. In February it had four IR-1 cascades two sets in tandem operating, each machines so centrifuges , producing In October the tally was still centrifuges in operation, but they were enriching only to 3.
Four further cascades had been installed and were ready, and there were a further eight cascades with equipment in place but not installed. In total, the FFEP produced kg of This was the site of experiments on undeclared laser enrichment about , and the facility has expanded greatly in recent years. It is not clear what activities are being pursued there, as IAEA has been denied information and access. However, there are some indications that work on laser enrichment may continue. In there was a high-profile announcement that the country has laser enrichment capability.
Over the Iranian centrifuge programme was set back by the Stuxnet computer virus which affected Iranian companies involved with the control systems for the IR-1 centrifuges. In late to early about centrifuges at FEP were decommissioned.
This appears to have been due to Stuxnet affecting frequency converters and causing the motors to over-speed, destroying the units. This positions Iran to stockpile a large amount of With about centrifuges operating through and to May , most at 0. Across its three facilities, 18, IR-1 centrifuges and IR-2m centrifuges were installed at May About 3, kg had been enriched to Another 4, kg of this was fed into the EUPP to make oxide, and 53 kg of this LEU was fed in the uranium conversion facility to produce uranium dioxide, leaving 8, kg of LEU hexafluoride.
The IAEA reports that the total 3. About kg of this LEU has been used to make kg of About kg of that material could be turned into 56 kg of weapons-grade uranium with input of only SWU, and the rate of production could readily be increased using installed capacity. The major explosion in July at Natanz see above is likely to significantly delay Iran's enrichment programme.
Some t of this was subsequently converted to UF 6 at Esfahan. This is the main, and practically the only, material being used in Iran's enrichment plants.
The ore is reported to have significant levels of molybdenum and other impurities which create difficulties in enrichment. AEOI is responsible for uranium exploration, mining and treatment. Most exploration is in central Iran. The ore is in surficial salt plugs, accessed by open pit. Total resources here are quoted at 84 tU at 0. This is delivered to the conversion plant at Isfahan. An underground mine was developed at Saghand in the central desert region of Yazd province over , and production from the metasomatite ore commenced there in Resources of tU at 0.
The first uranium oxide production from the mill was announced in April , and sent to the Isfahan conversion plant. A second consignment of 30 tonnes was in January Early in the AEOI announced that it proposed to buy tU from Kazakhstan over three years, with tU being delivered in the first two years.
The remaining tU would arrive in the third year, be converted to UF 6 , and sold back to Kazakhstan. To November it had produced kgU as enriched UO 2 product. A fuel fabrication plant is next to the UCF, and has been operational since Under the new nuclear deal, Iran has committed to extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection.
Such suspicions can be triggered by holes in the ground that could be uranium mines, intelligence reports, unexplained purchases, or isotope alarms. Basically, from the minute materials that could be used for a weapon comes out of the ground to the minute it is shipped out of the country, the IAEA will have eyes on it and anywhere Iran could try and take it:.
If Iran decided to rush to make a bomb without the deal in place, it would take them 2 to 3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium or highly enriched uranium to build their first nuclear weapon. Left unchecked, that stockpile and that number of centrifuges would grow exponentially, practically guaranteeing that Iran could create a bomb—and create one quickly — if it so chose. And should Iran violate any aspect of this deal, the U.
Read the Iran Deal You can read all pages of the Iran nuclear agreement on Medium, featuring additional explanations from the people who negotiated the deal and will be responsible for implementing it. What the World is Saying about the Iran Deal Nuclear physicists, military officials, non-proliferation experts, and more than countries across the globe have all voiced their support for the Iran nuclear deal because it is the best solution available to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon without taking military action.
Dick Lugar, former Republican Senator "This agreement represents our best chance to stop an Iranian bomb without another war in the Middle East. Heads of State, The U.
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